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Climate Change, Information, Beliefs and Action: Can new information affect
Swedes’ climate change mitigation efforts?
Abstract
This study illuminates which beliefs drive climate mitigation efforts in the Swedish public and how they
are affected by information. Using data gathered in an online experiment (n=372), this study finds that a
range of beliefs predict Swedes’ climate mitigation efforts. Mainly, it finds that the impact of correcting
misperceptions about either Sweden’s emissions or social norms is both varied and limited. Information
about Sweden’s emissions has a negative impact on climate policy support. This effect is not fully
explained by some respondents perceiving the information as lacking in credibility. Information about
norms has a positive impact on respondents self-estimated willingness to sacrifice more to fight climate
change.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Swedish citizens hold themselves in high regard when it comes to the fight against
climate change. Swedes’ view of their society's efforts against climate change is the
highest among nine advanced European economies featured in a 2021 PEW-poll,
ranking third globally behind Singapore and New Zealand (Pew Research Center,
2021, 15)1. Another recent survey, conducted by the EU, indicated that 31% of
Swedes think their government is doing “too much” or “enough” to tackle climate
change, compared to the EU average of 22% (EU, 2021). A related poll result
showed that the proportion of Swedes opposed to Sweden implementing stricter
climate measures has increased from 3% in 2008 to 14% in 2021 (Naturvårdsverket,
2021a, 7).
These findings do not align especially well with Sweden’s actual efforts in
relation to the 1.5°C goal2. Sweden's current per capita emissions are, despite some
progress, about nine times higher than the required world average for reaching the
1.5°C goal (Naturvårdsverket, 2021b). The aforementioned survey results could
therefore be indicative of a widening gap between Swedes’ actual and perceived
climate change mitigation efforts. For a democracy like Sweden to act against
climate change, knowing to what extent citizens are informed about their country’s
efforts in relation to the 1.5°C goal, and how such knowledge may affect citizens'
climate change mitigation efforts, is undoubtedly of great importance.
This paper will explore the link between beliefs and climate action among
the Swedish population. The main research question is formulated as follows: How
do two types of information affect climate mitigation efforts among people living
in Sweden? The two types of information relate to: Sweden’s actual emissions, in
relation to the 1.5°C goal and the percentage of Swedes who say they favor stricter
climate measures.
To answer the research question, data is gathered in an online survey
experiment (n=372). The analysis consists in three steps: (1) examining what beliefs
and factors motivate individual climate mitigation efforts, (2) documenting whether
or not people living in Sweden are misinformed about their country’s actual climate
mitigation efforts and mainly, (3) investigating how correcting misinformed beliefs
with information may affect such efforts.
1

The advanced economies included in this study were: Sweden, UK, Spain, Germany, France,
Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Italy, Canada, U.S, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan
2
The 1.5°C goal consists in limiting global warming to 1.5°C (UN, 2021b)
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1.2 Research purpose
This study adds to the expanding research on how beliefs affect behavior. More
specifically, it furthers the ongoing research on how certain beliefs affect climate
mitigation efforts and what the effects are of having those beliefs challenged by
new information. Establishing what role information can play in the fight against
climate change is a task both urgent and relevant for society. This study makes two
new contributions to the research on information provision and climate change
mitigation. First, it analyzes the impact of information about social norms on
climate change mitigation efforts in a current Swedish (or European) context.
Second, it introduces a new type of information treatment which informs the
subjects of how much one’s country’s per capita emissions need to be reduced in
order to be compatible with the 1.5°C goal.
Furthermore, this study will also contribute with new knowledge about what
individual beliefs and factors are at play in determining support for climate policies.
To my knowledge, this has not been done before in the present Swedish context, a
country that stands out by having high perceived climate mitigation efforts. The
results in this study may provide future guidance regarding the impact similar
information interventions can have in countries where the public opinion is similar
to what the opinion currently looks like in Sweden.

1.3 Background
Climate change is becoming increasingly tangible for people all over the world.
Those that have not been directly affected by higher temperatures or other alarming
weather conditions have witnessed the proliferation of concerns amongst states and
politicians. Especially so in the wake of the recent climate meeting in Glasgow,
where new efforts were made to limit global warming to 1.5°C by the end of the
century (UN, 2021a). The 1.5°C goal requires that the world has net-zero
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 and that emissions are reduced by 45%
until 2030 (UN, 2021b).
Yet, however vital the fulfillment of the 1.5°C goal is, it is nevertheless
ambitious. Striving toward 1.5°C will entail impractical consequences for some
states, as well as for their citizens' everyday lives, since greenhouse gas emissions
need to be drastically reduced within a short time frame (Rogelj et al., 2016, Raftery
et al., 2017). Precisely what further measures will be necessary and what sacrifices
citizens are willing to put up with remains to be seen.
Though climate change is taken seriously in many countries, public opinion
on one’s country’s efforts and how many personal sacrifices citizens are willing to
make to fight climate change vary (Pew Research Center, 2021). As stated in the
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introduction, Swedish citizens have a relatively high opinion3 of their own climate
change mitigation efforts. This is so despite Sweden having per capita emissions
far from the 1.5°C goal required world average along with the rest of the EU4 and
most other developed countries (Our World in Data, 2020). If there exists such a
“knowledge gap” between Swedish citizens actual and perceived climate change
mitigation efforts, obtaining new information about the actual state of affairs may
have an impact on Swedes’ decisions both in the private and political sphere.
1.3.1 Information, beliefs, and decisions
Finding and measuring the impact of “knowledge gaps” is of interest for social
scientists since they matter both for individual decisions as well as in democratic
discourse and policy support (Haaland et al., 2020, Diamond et al., 2020). However,
what actual impact mere information can have on decisions, especially when it
comes to policy support, is a contested subject (Diamond et al., 2020).
Studying how people make decisions in the private and political realm is a
central aspect within the field of economics. Standard economic theories normally
understand decisions by looking at various factors, among which are information
and beliefs. In economic experiments, one often attempts altering one of these
factors for a given subgroup to see what effect it may have on their decision
(Haaland et al., 2020, 1).
According to the Bayesian model of information processing, individuals
aim to have accurate beliefs and thereby update them after receiving credible and
relevant information (Diamond et al., 2020, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). The
model states that for belief updating to occur, the individuals already held (or
“prior”) beliefs must both conflict with the newly received information as well as
weakly held (Bullock, 2009). Thus, if an individual has a strongly held prior belief,
they might not update their belief on basis of receiving new information.
1.3.2 Information provision experiments
Information provision experiments have been used to study how some particular
piece of information might affect an agent's choices or belief formation. A common
way to perform information provision experiments is by presenting some piece of
factual information to a subgroup of participants in an experiment. This piece of
3

A contributing factor to this could be the often-cited statistic on territorial emissions per capita,
where Sweden ranks below the world average (Our World in Data, 2021). The territorial statistic
omits emissions that occur elsewhere through Swedish consumption. Sweden is in fact one of EU’s
top three importers of Co2, with around 65% of domestic emissions being embedded in trade (Our
World in Data, 2020)
4
Sweden’s consumption based Co2 emissions are somewhat lower than the EU-28 average.
Sweden's yearly consumption based Co2 emissions per capita in 2019 were 6.76 tonnes Co2 per
capita and the EU-28 average 7.74 tonnes Co2 per capita (Our World in Data, 2020). Note: Co2, not
GHG.
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information may challenge subjects' prior beliefs about how they perceive the
world. A control group receives no information, thereby creating variation in the
information subjects have access to (Haaland et al., 2020). As an example, in a
study by Grigorieff et al (2020) participants in the US estimated the percentage of
unemployed immigrants. A number of participants were informed of the true
percentage and the effect of this message was then measured on variables such as
participants' level of support for immigration policies or their beliefs about certain
immigrant characteristics.
The type of information utilized in information experiments varies. A
common way is to present factual information that likely challenges the
respondents' descriptive perception of the world. For instance, this can be done with
a scientific message, e.g., Diamond et al. (2020) or by presenting demographic
facts, e.g., Grigorieff et al. (2020).
Another common type of facts utilized in information provision
experiments are those that aim to target subjects' normative beliefs, i.e., beliefs that
relate to how subjects’ think they ought to behave. Stating for instance, what
percentage of people act in a certain way or hold some particular attitude might
affect the perceived normative expectations put on the individual by their societal
context (Bicchieri & Dimant, 2019, Andre et al., 2021). Such interventions (or
“norm-nudges”) only work however, if the targeted attitude or behavior is
conditional on what others think and do. The others that are referred to in such
interventions, such as neighbors or compatriots, must be viewed as being part of
the same “network” as the subject defines themselves as being a part of (Bicchieri
& Dimant, 2019). Some examples follow in the literature review below.

1.4 Literature review
This section provides a brief introduction of relevant studies that have analyzed the
impact of information on beliefs and behavior or policy preferences, generally or in
relation to the issue of climate change.
In a well-known study, Alesina et al. (2018) show how information about
intergenerational mobility affects subjects' preferences for redistribution in France,
Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the US. They found that presenting information that is
pessimistic about intergenerational mobility increases support for redistributive
policies, especially so for subjects who identify as politically left wing. Another
recent example is Settele & Shupe (2021) analyzing how the perceived tradeoffs
between human lives and economic benefit affect support for stricter lockdown
measures during the covid-19 pandemic.
A great number of studies have investigated the impact of providing
information about prevalent social behavior, opinions, and norms. For instance,
Bursztyn et al. (2020) found that young married men in Saudi Arabia greatly
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underestimate the number of other similarly aged men that are in favor of women
working outside the home. By providing subjects with the actual percentage of
young men who favor women working outside the home, it increased their
willingness to help their wives in joining the labor market. In another well-known
study, Allcott (2011) showed that by informing US households of how their own
power usage stands in relation to their neighbors, they reduced their electricity
consumption similar to what a 11-20% price increase would have.
More recent studies have also looked at the impact of scientific and social
information on climate mitigation efforts specifically. In a yet unpublished study,
Andre et al. (2021) found that the US public underestimates the percentage of other
Americans in favor of fighting climate change. The subjects that were informed of
the actual percentages increased both their willingness to donate to a climate charity
as well as their support for climate change mitigation policies. They also found
economic and moral preferences such as altruism and universalism significant in
determining willingness to fight climate change. In another study, Diamond et al.
(2020) demonstrated a significant impact on support for evidence-based
environmental policies by providing scientific information to subjects in Germany
and the US. Hobman & Ashworth (2013) performed an experiment on the
Australian public and found that factual information about generation cost and
emissions changed subjects' support for various energy sources.

2. Method
This section will explain how the study was carried out as well as how the variables
were measured.
The data used was gathered in an experiment carried out in the form of an
online survey. To study what beliefs and other factors may influence climate change
mitigation efforts, a wide range of variables were taken into account. These are to
some extent based on variables utilized or found significant in an unpublished study
by Andre et al. (2021), studying the influence of social norms on willingness to
fight climate change.

2.1 Sample
Data was obtained from 439 people living in Sweden through an online survey in
December 2021. 49 respondents were eliminated from the sample due to missing
data about either income, political preference, or gender, due to these later being
used as control variables. An additional 18 respondents were removed for failing
the attention screener question, leaving a total sample of n=372 respondents.
The requirements to take part in the survey were to be living in Sweden and
at least 18 years of age. Participants were recruited through Lund University entry
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level economics course pages as well as various Facebook groups for people
residing in the Malmö, Gothenburg, or Jönköping area. After collection, the data
was organized using Microsoft Excel and the analysis carried out in Eviews 12.

2.2 Survey layout
This section will present a simplified5 layout of the survey6. The following sections
will then explain the main variables and measurements in greater detail.
The survey was designed using Google Forms and contained 5 sections, or
6 for those who received an information treatment. The order can be seen in the
“Survey layout” image below. The survey was identical for all respondents except
for the differing information treatments received by Group 1 and Group 2. Group
3, the control group, received no information and immediately proceeded to section
3 after finishing section 2.
After survey respondents had clicked the link to the survey, they saw a
greeting message as well as the
requirements to take part, which
were being at least 18 and currently
living in Sweden. The first section
then elicited respondents' basic
demographic facts such as, age,
gender, income, level of education
and city size. Section 2 elicited the
respondents' prior beliefs concerning
Sweden's emissions and social
norms, further explained in 2.3.1.
Section 2 also contained an attention
screener question to test whether
respondents were carefully reading
the questions (Haaland et al., 2020).
Due to Google forms lacking a builtin randomization function, the
attention screener was also used to
sort respondents into three groups by
asking them to select a symbol7. The
randomization resulted in groups
that were somewhat numerically
5

A couple of measurements: climate change denial and government trust, were not used in the
analysis will therefore omitted
6
See Appendix for a print-out version of the full survey in Swedish
7
See Appendix page 35

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol18/iss1/10

6

Kihlstedt: Climate change: Information, beliefs and action

uneven, yet not significantly different in any of the main variables, as is shown in
the balance table on page 13.
Respondents were then assigned to either the treatment groups (1 and 2) or
the control group (3). The information treatments will be explained in 2.3.2. After
seeing the provided information, the treatment groups were asked if they
understood the information and on a 5-point likert scale state their level of trust in
it (Haaland et al., 2020). Thereafter, in section 3, followed questions that elicited
respondents' support for various climate policies, explained in 2.3.3. The policy
questions followed directly after the treatments in order to minimize any effect
other unrelated questions might have had on these answers.
In sections 4 and 5 respondents were asked questions relating to various
social and economic preferences, such as altruism, universalism, and political
preferences. These will be explained in 2.4. Questions in sections 4 and 5 were
somewhat mixed to make the sections more even in length and to keep the
respondent more engaged. The survey ended with asking respondents about their
self-estimated “willingness to sacrifice more” for the climate, as well as their
posterior beliefs about Sweden’s emissions and social norms.

2.3 Main variables and information treatment
This section goes over the three most central components and measurements of the
survey. These are: 1. The two main belief variables, relating to what the respondent
believes about Sweden’s emissions and social norms. 2. The information treatment
and 3. The variables representing respondents’ climate change mitigation efforts,
namely (1) Policy support and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more for the climate.
2.3.1 Measuring beliefs about emissions and social norms
Analyzing the impact of certain beliefs on climate mitigation efforts was the main
objective of the study, therefore clear measurements of these beliefs were a
necessity. The two main beliefs, those targeted by the information treatment, relate
to Sweden’s emissions and social norms.
The beliefs were measured twice in the survey, in section 2 (Prior beliefs)
and in section 5 (Posterior beliefs). Prior beliefs were elicited to allow for analyzing
belief revisions and heterogeneity in treatment effects between respondents with
differing prior beliefs. Posterior beliefs served as the main variable representing
beliefs in the analysis, and how it was measured is explained below.
Emissions belief: The posterior emissions belief was measured by
respondents answering the question: “Compared to the level of emissions
needed to reach the goal of 1,5 °C - how much is Sweden currently emitting

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2021

7

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 18 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 10

per person and year?” There were 9 different alternatives ranging from “10
times less” to “about the same” to “10 times more”.
Norms belief: Respondents' posterior beliefs about perceived social norms
was measured by their answer to the question: “Out of 100 Swedes, how
many want stricter government measures to fight climate change?”. This
belief thus captured the percentage of Swedish citizens that the respondent
thinks would favor stricter government climate measures.
The questions eliciting posteriors were placed in section 5 of the survey to separate
them as much as possible from the questions eliciting prior beliefs. The wording of
the questions eliciting priors was slightly different8 from the questions eliciting
posteriors that are stated above. These measures were taken to minimize the risk of
confusing respondents or causing consistency bias in their answers (Haaland et al.,
2020).
2.3.2 Information treatments
Between section 2 and three, respondents were divided into three groups whereof
two were given information treatments. The two treatments were attempts to affect
respondents’ potentially misinformed emissions and norms beliefs. The main
reason for including two differing treatments was to allow for comparison of the
effect between the newly introduced emissions treatment with a more commonly
used type of intervention in information experiments, which is the norms treatment.
This section will present the design of the information treatments.
The information treatments were framed in a simple and neutral way. The
information was portrayed both in text and with a graph (Haaland et al., 2020). Both
treatments were similarly worded and displayed to minimize the presentation
resulting in a varying effect. The details of each treatment are explained below.
a. Emissions treatment
Respondents who received the emissions treatment saw the following text:
“Research has shown that Sweden currently emits 9 tonnes greenhouse
gasses per person and year. The 1,5 °C goal requires a world average of 1
tonne per person and year.”. The source of the information was the Swedish
environmental protection agency, Naturvårdsverket (2021b) which was
displayed on the graph (see image (a.) below).

8

The question eliciting the prior norms belief differed by specifically mentioning government
measures that “impose changes on people’s behavior”, which also was the exact wording of the
information treatment.
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b. Norms treatment
Similarly, respondents who received the norms treatment saw the following
text: “Research has shown that the percentage of Swedes in favor of stricter
government measures, that impose changes on people's behavior, to fight
climate change9 is 76%.”. The graphs accompanying the texts of each
treatment can be seen below. The information was taken from a survey
conducted by the European Investment bank (2021) and the source was
displayed on the graph (see image (b.) below).
(a.) Emissions treatment graph

(b.) Norms treatment graph

Survey treatments: Above are the graphs that were shown to each treatment group along
with their respective text message. Note that the images were somewhat bigger in the actual
survey (see Appendix pages 36 and 37).

9

In the actual survey, the term “Global warming” was used rather than “Climate change” for all
questions due to simplicity. See Andre et al. (2021, 6)
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c. Control group
Respondents in the control group received no information and proceeded to
section 3 of the survey immediately after finishing section 2.
Having an identical source for both treatments would have been ideal, but no
common source was found. The two pieces of information were therefore carefully
selected based on having a credible source as well as for their simplicity and
potential to challenge respondents’ prior beliefs.
After seeing the information, respondents in the treatment groups were
asked if they understood the information and had to state their degree of trust in it
on a five-point likert scale (Haaland et al., 2020). Following the treatments,
measurements of respondents’ climate mitigation efforts were elicited.
2.3.3 Measuring climate change mitigation efforts in two ways
The two main dependent variables were measurements of climate mitigation
efforts. These were (1) “Climate policy support”, elicited in section 3 of the survey,
and (2) “Willingness to sacrifice more for the climate”. elicited in section 5 of the
survey. Both measurements were taken after the treatment to enable measuring of
the effect of the treatment on both these variables by comparing the three groups.
(1) Climate policy support: The main way climate change mitigation efforts
were measured, was through respondents' support for various climate
policies. Respondents were asked to state their support for seven different
climate policies on a six-point likert scale. Their levels of support for the
seven climate policies were summed, and the standardized sum made up the
(1) “Policy support” variable. The individual policies that respondents had
to evaluate were10:
1. Funding more research into renewable energy.
2. Provide tax rebates for people who purchase energy efficient
vehicles and solar panels
3. Regulate Co2 emissions more strictly
4. Require that the electricity Sweden imports has not caused GHG
emissions elsewhere even if it costs the average household an extra
1000kr/year
5. Increase taxes and fees on goods and services that cause high
GHG-emissions in Sweden or abroad.
6. Increase the flight tax
7. Introduce a tax on meat.
10

Policies 1, 2, 3, 4 are similar to those utilized in an information experiment by Andre et al. (2021)
on the US public. Policies 5, 6 and 7 were introduced to better fit the Swedish case.
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(2) “Willingness to sacrifice more for the climate”: A complementary
measure of climate change mitigation efforts was the respondents’ selfestimated willingness to sacrifice more to fight climate change. The
respondents answered on a five-point likert scale how much they agreed
with the statement "Me and others living in Sweden must make (further)
personal sacrifices to fight climate change".
This measurement was introduced to capture any effects the
treatment may have had, in a more general and less concrete sense, on
respondents' climate change mitigation efforts. Respondents may want to
fight climate change, yet not view any of the specific climate policies as an
appropriate means to do so, in which case this variable will capture such
attitudes.

2.4 Measuring other preferences
Other preferences that may impact respondents’ climate change mitigation efforts
were also elicited in section 4 and 5 of the survey. These will be explained in this
section. The measurements were based on the variables found most significant in a
study by Andre et al. (2021) in predicting willingness to fight climate change. The
way the variables were measured was somewhat simplified to keep survey
completion time around 5 minutes.
The only newly introduced variable is “individual denialism”, meant to
reflect the belief that one's individual efforts to fight climate change do not make
any difference in the big picture. All preference and belief variables (except dummy
variables) were standardized before the analysis to have a mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1.
Altruism was measured through a couple questions, one qualitative and one
quantitative (Haaland et al., 2020). The qualitative measure was the respondents’
level of agreement with the statement “I am willing to give to good causes without
expecting anything in return” on a five-point likert scale. The qualitative measure
asked the respondent how much they would donate to a good cause if they were to
unexpectedly receive 10 000 kr today. To make up the altruism variable, the answer
to the qualitative question was divided by 100 and summed with the response to the
qualitative question.
Universalism was used as a measurement of how much the respondent identifies
as part of their nation or as a part of the world, which is relevant in the case of a
global problem like climate change. Similar to how the variable was measured in a
study by Lind et al. (2018), the respondents answered on a five-point likert scale if
they viewed themselves mainly as citizens of Sweden (1) or the world (5).
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Individual denialism was used as a measurement of whether the respondent holds
the belief that their own individual emissions do not make any difference for the
issue of climate change. The viewpoint has even been philosophically defended
(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010)11 and may therefore be a robust justifying belief for
individuals to not fight climate change by individual action. The variable was
measured by asking respondents how well, on a five-point likert scale, the following
statement reflects their view: "My individual emissions do not make any significant
difference in the big picture. I, as an individual, cannot affect climate change"
Political preferences were measured by asking respondents if they identified more
as “Politically left”, “Politically middle” or “Politically right”. Asking for more
specific party support was not done since it likely would have made more
respondents unsure of their choice.
Basic demographic facts including age, level of education, gender, income, and
city size were also elicited to be used as additional control variables and comparing
the demographics between groups (see balance table on next page).

3. Results
This section will present the results of the analysis. Section 3.1 looks at what factors
determine climate mitigation efforts while section 3.2 and onward presents the
effects of the treatments.
The next page displays the balance table over the full sample as well as the
treatment groups. The randomization in Google forms made the emissions
treatment group somewhat bigger than the other two groups. The randomization
was successful overall since the groups did not significantly differ in most
characteristics or prior beliefs. The groups differed significantly only in the age and
income variables. Both are controlled for in the main analyses. Nevertheless, it
cannot be ascertained that the sample is an accurate representation of the Swedish
public.

11

The name “individual denialism” comes from John Broome’s (2019) criticism of the view.
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Balance table

% Of total

Emissions
treatment

Norms
treatment

Control
group

Full
sample

44%
(n=165)

27%
(n=102)

29%
(n=106)

100%
(n=372)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

P-value

Mean

SD

Age

39.451

13.550

33.990

11.886

36.047

12.210

0.002

36.984

12.912

Income

33817.1

17198.3

28784.3

15392.9

31603.8

16908

0.057

31806.4

16723.5

City (100k+)

0.750

0.434

0.725

0.448

0.717

0.453

0.816

0.734

0.443

Female

0.695

0.462

0.755

0.432

0.698

0.461

0.539

0.712

0.453

Student

0.189

0.393

0.284

0.453

0.245

0.432

0.186

0.231

0.422

Uni. degree

0.646

0.480

0.647

0.480

0.613

0.489

0.834

0.637

0.481

Priors: Emissions

3.701

3.489

3.422

3.777

2.802

3.867

0.146

3.368

3.692

Priors: Norms

0.388

0.188

0.392

0.196

0.394

0.183

0.959

0.391

0.189

Politically left

0.415

0.494

0.461

0.501

0.330

0.474

0.147

0.403

0.491

Politically middle

0.311

0.464

0.294

0.458

0.311

0.466

0.951

0.306

0.462

Politically right

0.274

0.448

0.245

0.432

0.358

0.480

0.166

0.290

0.455

Above is the balance table over samples from the survey experiment. The p-value refers to comparing the three groups, emissions treatment, norms treatment
and control group with an ANOVA test.
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3.1 Determinants of Swedes’ climate mitigation efforts
This section looks at the relationship between climate mitigation efforts and beliefs
about Sweden’s emissions, social norms, and other economic and social
preferences. In other words, it will see into any correlational evidence of the link
between climate mitigation efforts and various beliefs and factors. The causal
effects of the treatments will be then analyzed in the following section (3.2).
To investigate what factors influence Swedes’ climate change mitigation
efforts, two regressions are run. The dependent variables, (1) “Policy support” and
(2) “Willingness to sacrifice more” for the climate, are regressed on what the
respondent believes about: Sweden’s emissions in relation to the 1.5°C goal
(posterior emissions belief), the percentage of Swedes in favor of stricter climate
measures (posterior norms belief), as well as a range of other preferences and
sociodemographic factors. To simplify the interpretation of the results, all measures
of beliefs and preferences have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of 1. Detailed results are shown in Table 1 on the next page.
Beliefs about Sweden’s emissions and social norms are found highly
significant in predicting both (1) Policy support and (2) Willingness to sacrifice
more for the climate. A standard deviation increase in the emissions belief increases
(1) Policy support by 0.171 and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more by 0.184 (of a
standard deviation). Since a standard deviation for the posterior emissions belief is
approximately equal to 4 (4.12 tons of GHG per capita), the result can be interpreted
as follows: if a respondent’s emissions belief increases by 4, (1) Policy support
increases by 0.171 and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more by 0.184.
Similar results are found for the norms belief, where a standard deviation
increase corresponds to 0.178 increase in (1) Policy support and a 0.146 increase in
(2) Willingness to sacrifice more. The posterior norms belief is measured by
percentage points and has a standard deviation of approximately 20% (21.1%). This
result can therefore be interpreted as: if a respondent's belief about the percentage
of Swedes in favor of stricter climate measures increases by 20%, (1) Policy support
increases by 0.178 and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more increases by 0.146.
These results indicate that both beliefs about how Sweden is doing in
relation to the 1.5°C goal and about the percentage of Swedes in favor of stricter
measures affect Swedes’ climate change mitigation efforts, measured as policy
support and self-estimated willingness to sacrifice more for the climate. The effect
of the norms belief on (1) and (2) indicates that Swedes’ climate mitigation efforts
depend therefore partly on social expectations, since they are conditional on what
an individual believes others are in favor of.
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(1) Policy support

(2) Willingness to sacrifice more

Emissions belief

0.171***
(0.047)

0.184***
(0.049)

Norms belief

0.178***
(0.045)

0.146***
(0.044)

Altruism

0.129**
(0.055)

0.119**
(0.056)

Universalism

0.107**
(0.049)

0.126**
(0.056)

Individual denialism

-0.215***
(0.047)

-0.358***
(0.050)

Age

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.000
(0.004)

Log income

-0.112
(0.154)

0.109
(0.154)

Female

0.097
(0.109)

0.111
(0.111)

Student

0.071
(0.201)

0.193
(0.209)

Politically left

0.325***
(0.098)

0.113
(0.103)

Politically right

-0.325***
(0.114)

-0.301**
(.123)

University degree

0.126
(0.095)

0.052
(0.101)

City (>100k inhabitants)

-0.013
(0.112)

-0.118
(0.107)

Constant

1.09
(1.531)

-1.11
(1.538)

R² (adjusted)

0.341

0.323

N

372

372

TABLE 1
Beliefs

Economic and social pref.

Sociodemographics

Above are OLS estimates based on 372 survey responses. The dependent variables are (1) Policy support and
(2) Willingness to sacrifice more to fight climate change. All variables, except the binary dummy variables, are
standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The dummy variables are “Female”, “Student”,
“Politically left”, “Politically right”, “University degree” and “City”. The constant represents the intercept for
respondents who are male, non-student, politically middle, hold no university degree and do not live in a city
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Moreover, other factors are also shown to have an effect on (1) Policy
support and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more. Both “Altruism” and “Universalism”
have a positive impact on both dependent variables. Unsurprisingly, individual
denialism toward climate change is found to have a highly significant negative
impact on both (1) and (2). The negative effect is larger in the case of (2)
Willingness to sacrifice more, which seems reasonable since (2) clearly relates to
individual efforts as opposed to climate policies which are instances of societal
effort.
Political preferences are also found significant, especially among
respondents who identify as politically right. People who identify as politically right
are less likely to favor stricter climate policies as well as less likely to be willing to
sacrifice more for the climate. People who identify as politically left show higher
levels of support for stricter climate policies. This is unsurprising since most of the
policies involve higher taxes or more governmental influence over people’s
choices. Identifying as politically left showed no statistically significant effect on
(2) Willingness to sacrifice more.
The age, income, student, and gender variables were found insignificant.
This was also the case for the city variable. The vast majority (+70%) of
respondents lived in a city, defined as having 100k+ inhabitants.
In sum, a wide variety of factors influence Swedes’ climate mitigation
efforts, measured as (1) Policy support and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more for the
climate. Both the emissions and norms beliefs are found to have a significant
positive effect. A range of normative beliefs are also shown to have an impact.
These include political preferences, but also economic and moral beliefs such as
altruism, universalism and individual denialism.

3.2 Correcting misinformed beliefs
The two treatments were attempts to exogenously vary respondents’ beliefs about
either Sweden’s emissions or prevalent social norms. This section investigates how
the various treatments affected respondents' beliefs and how it impacted their (1)
Policy support and (2) Willingness to sacrifice more for the climate.
The effect of the treatment will to some extent depend on respondents' prior
beliefs. The averages of the prior beliefs were significantly different from the actual
share both for the emissions and norms belief. This indicates that the respondents
are to some extent misinformed about Sweden’s emissions and the number of
Swedes in favor of stricter measures. Below is the distribution of prior beliefs
shown in relation to the actual amount.
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Prior beliefs: Above are how respondents' prior beliefs were distributed, the average prior belief
(blue line) as well as the actual share (dotted red line). Panel A’s horizontal axis shows the possible
answers to the question eliciting prior emissions beliefs. For instance, the answer “-10” corresponds
to the belief that Sweden’s current emissions are 10 times less than what the 1.5°C goal requires,
“0” that they are about the same, “5” five times more etc. Panel B's horizontal axis shows the
possible answers to the question eliciting prior norms beliefs, namely percentages. For instance, the
answer 0.3 corresponds to believing that 30% of Swedes are in favor of stricter climate measures.
Average beliefs differ significantly different from actual share, ***p < 0.001 in both cases.

3.2.1 Treatment effects
Section 3.1 demonstrated that respondents' emissions and norms beliefs positively
predict climate change mitigation efforts. Panel A and B in section 3.2, show that
respondents both underestimate Sweden’s emissions and the percentage of Swedes
in favor of stricter climate measures. This section will look specifically at how the
information treatments, aiming to correct these misperceived beliefs, affected
respondents' climate change mitigation efforts. Control variables are included in the
analysis (as stated under each table), but their coefficients will not be displayed
since they were analyzed in the previous section. This section is mainly concerned
with the effects the two information treatments had on respondents’ climate change
mitigation efforts.
To investigate the effect of the information treatment, four regressions are
run. The main dependent variables (1) Policy support and (2) Willingness to
sacrifice more, are regressed on the treatment dummies and a number of control
variables. The results can be seen in Graphs 1 and 2 on the next page. To study
whether respondents revised their beliefs after receiving the treatments, the
variables: (3) Posterior emissions belief and (4) Posterior norms belief are also
regressed on the same variables. Details of all four regressions can be found in
Table 2, below graphs on the next page.
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Graph 1 (Left). This graph shows the effects of the treatments with 95% confidence intervals.
Emissions treatment (upper half) showed a significant negative effect on dep. variable (1) Policy
support. Norms treatment (Lower half) showed a significant positive effect on dep. variable (2)
Willingness to sacrifice more. Detailed results are displayed in Table 2. Controls are stated below
Table 2.
Graph 2 (Right). This graph shows the significant effect of the emissions treatment on 4 out of the
7 policies that make up the (1) Policy support variable with 95% confidence intervals. Same controls
as in Table 2 are included. Treatment did not show any significant effect on the remaining policies.

TABLE
2
- (1) Policy
Treatment effects. support

(2) Willingness to
sacrifice more

(3) Posterior
emissions belief

(4) Posterior
norms belief

Emissions treatment

-0.203*
(1.07)

0.015
(0.121)

0.980***
(0.107)

-0.073
(0.106)

Norms treatment

0.001
(0.120)

0.245*
(0.130)

0.061
(0.121)

1.073***
(0.122)

N

372

372

372

372

Above are OLS estimates for the different treatment groups. The dependent variables are (1) Policy
support, (2) Willingness to sacrifice more to fight climate change, (3) Posterior emissions belief and
(4) Posterior norms belief. The dependent variables have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and
standard deviation of 1. Treatment variables are binary dummy variables.
Controls are “Female” “Age” “Log income” “Politically left”, “Politically right” and “City”
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Both treatments showed some effect on the main dependent variables (1) and (2),
albeit in contrasting ways. The group receiving the emissions treatment lowered
their policy support by 0.203 of a standard deviation compared to the control group.
The result was similar (-0.202) without controls, but with a higher degree of
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significance (**p<0.01)12. The negative effect of the emissions treatment on
respondents’ policy support is surprising, since the emissions belief was found to
positively predict climate mitigation efforts (in 3.1). This result will be analyzed
further in the next section (3.2.2) and in the discussion. Graph 2 on the preceding
page shows the significant effect of the emissions treatment on specific policies.
The negative effect of the emissions treatment is significant in four out of the seven
climate policies, displayed in Graph 2.
The norms treatment did not show any significant difference from the
control group in regard to (1), Policy support. In regard to (2) Willingness to
sacrifice more however, the norms treatment had a positive effect. In determining
(2), the intercept of the group receiving the norms treatment was 0.245 of a standard
deviation above the control group.
Respondents' beliefs about both Sweden’s emissions in relation to the 1.5°C
goal (emissions belief) and the percentage of other Swedes in favor of stricter
measures (norms belief) were, as described in the method section of this paper,
elicited both before and after the information treatment. It is thereby possible to
measure the extent to which the treatments revised respondents' beliefs in the
various groups. The results can be seen in the last two columns of Table 2 on the
preceding page, where the posterior beliefs about (3) emissions and (4) norms are
the dependent variables. The results show that the treatments successfully revise
respondents’ beliefs for each treatment group by about a standard deviation. The
results can be interpreted as: group receiving the emissions treatment responded,
on average, that Swedes emit approximately 4 tons of GHG more than the other
groups when their posterior beliefs were elicited. For the posterior norms belief, the
norms treatment group responded on average with a percentage that was about 22%
above the other groups. There are no significant spill-over effects between the
groups, meaning that the emissions treatment didn’t affect the posterior norms
beliefs or vice versa. Both treatments thus, successfully revised beliefs upward,
closer to what the information in each treatment indicated.
3.2.2 Mediation analysis
In Table 1 respondents’ posterior beliefs about both Sweden’s emissions were
shown to positively predict (1) Policy support. However, those in the emissions
treatment group showed significantly lower policy support than the control group,
despite having their beliefs revised upward. This may depend on the emissions
treatment having a direct negative effect on (1) Policy support, separable from the
effect of respondents' posterior beliefs.
The analysis thus far has assumed that posterior beliefs would mediate the
effect of the treatment on the dependent variables. In other words, that the treatment
12

This result without controls is not shown in any table or graph
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(Independent variable, X) affected respondents' posterior belief (mediator variable,
M), which in turn affects the dependent variable (Y) and that the treatment itself
has no direct significant effect on the dependent variables. Mediation analysis is
used to analyze the extent to which the effect of X is mediated via the mediator
variable and would in the present case show if X had a direct significant effect on
Y, independent from the effect of respondents' posterior beliefs.
A common way of conducting mediation analysis involves a few steps
(Baron & Kenny, 1986, Croson et al., 2009). Relationships 1, 2 and 3 (shown in the
figure to the left) are tested for significance. The fourth and final step involves
predicting (Y) while including both X and M in the regression. If X then becomes
insignificant or greatly reduces, in
predicting Y, the effect is fully
mediated through the mediation
variable. The results of these four
regressions can be seen in “Table 3”
below.
TABLE 3 - Mediation 1. Posteriors
analysis
emissions (M)
Emissions treatment (X)

0.938***
(0.109)

Posteriors emissions (M)
N

2. Policy
support (Y)

3. Policy
support (Y)

4. Policy
support (Y)

-0.229**
(0.113)

-0.458***
(0.124)

0.138**
(0.056)
270

270

0.244***
(0.062)
270

270

Above are 4 OLS estimates for the mediation analysis. Included data is from the emissions treatment
group and control group. The dependent variable is respondents' posterior emissions belief in
regression 1 and policy support in regressions 2-4. The variables have been standardized to have a
mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Emissions treatment variable is a binary dummy variable.
Controls are “Politically left” and “Politically right”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The results of the mediation analysis shows that all variables are found to
be highly significant in all regressions, including regression 4, where both the
independent and mediator variables predict policy support (Y). This indicates that
the posterior beliefs variable (M) does not mediate the effect of the treatment (X)
on Policy support (Y). Rather, the emissions treatment is shown to have a direct
effect on the dependent variable, which is negative, contrary to the impact of the
mediation variable. This indicates that the emissions treatment had a direct,
negative effect, on the dependent variable separable from the effect of respondents'
beliefs about Sweden’s emissions.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol18/iss1/10

20

Kihlstedt: Climate change: Information, beliefs and action

3.2.3 Effects in subgroups
Four subgroups are separately analyzed to explore whether the treatment effects
varied among respondents. The first comparison, in Table 4, is between two groups
with varying prior beliefs in the treatment information. In “High prior beliefs”
(column 2 and 3) respondents who had prior beliefs roughly below the mean in a
treatment group, were eliminated from the analysis. In other words, respondents
who had a prior emissions belief of 2 tonnes GHG per capita or less were eliminated
from the emissions treatment group. Similarly, respondents who had a prior norms
belief of less than 50% were eliminated from the norms treatment group. The “Low
prior beliefs” (column 4 and 5) group is made by inverting the sorting procedure.
The results can be seen in Table 4.
The second comparison looks at varying effects between groups with
different degrees of trust in the treatment information. Groups are similarly sorted.
In “High trust in treatment”, respondents who received a treatment but answered
that their trust in the treatment information was <4 on the five-point likert scale
were eliminated. The “Low trust in treatment” group is again made by inverting the
procedure. Results are shown in table 5.
TABLE 4

High Prior
Beliefs

Low Prior
Beliefs

(1) Policy support

(2) Willingness to
sacrifice more

(1) Policy
support

(2) Willingness
to sacrifice more

Emissions
treatment

-0.132
(0.123)

-0.067
(0.139)

-0.296**
(0.135)

0.06
(0.145)

Norms
treatment

-0.080
(0.167)

0.133
(0.188)

0.037
(0.138)

0.317**
(0.148)

N

236

236

244

244

TABLE 5

High trust in
treat.

Low trust in
treat.

(1) Policy support

(2) Willingness to
sacrifice more

(1) Policy
support

(2) Willingness to
sacrifice more

Emissions
treatment

0.165
(0.112)

0.250*
(0.133)

-0.591***
(0.140)

-0.232
(0.150)

Norms
treatment

0.202
(0.140)

0.281*
(0.166)

-0.112
(0.151)

0.259
(0.131)

N

239

239

239

239
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Above, in table 4 and 5 on the preceding page, are the OLS estimates for 4 different subgroups.
Table 4 – In “High priors” respondents who received a treatment with priors <50% in the norms
treatment group and <5 tonnes GHG-emissions in the emissions treatment group have been
removed. “Low priors” is made by the inverse procedure.
Table 5 - In “High trust in treatment” respondents who stated that they trusted the information
provided with <4 on a 5-point likert scale representing trust have been removed. “Low trust in treat.”
is made by inverting the procedure.
The dependent variables have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
Treatment variables are binary dummy variables.
Controls are “Female” “Age” “Log income” “Politically left”, “Politically right” and “City”
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The subgroup analysis indicates some heterogeneity in how the treatment
affected respondents. Comparing the two groups that differ in prior beliefs, seen in
Table 4, the group driving the effect of both treatments is the group with low prior
beliefs. Compared to the full sample, the treatment effects are enhanced in the group
with low priors and insignificant in the group with high prior beliefs. This aligns
with the treatment having a stronger impact when it more drastically challenges the
respondents previously held beliefs. No new significant effects could be discerned
in any subgroup with varying prior beliefs.
A higher degree of heterogeneity is found when the two subgroups, based
on respondents' level of trust in the treatment information, are compared. Those
with low trust in the emissions treatment show a large and highly significant
negative effect, of almost 0.6 of a standard deviation, on (1) Policy support. In stark
contrast, respondents with high trust in the treatment show a positive, yet
insignificant, effect on the same variable. For those with high trust in the emissions
treatment information, the treatment even had a significant positive effect of 0.250
on (2) Willingness to sacrifice more. This was the only positive significant effect
found on (1) or (2) caused by emissions treatment in any of the analyses conducted.
The high degree of heterogeneity in the effects of the emissions treatment,
found by looking at varying levels of trust among respondents, may indicate that
some respondents found the emissions treatment information hard to believe or that
it lacked credibility. However, people in the low trust group still revised their
posterior beliefs after receiving the treatment with an effect similar to the full
sample13. This may point to some other factor also driving the effect, as was
indicated by the mediation analysis, even for the group with low trust.
Looking at the effects of the norms treatment for subgroups with varying
degrees of trust, the positive effect remained in both groups, but the variable just
barely became insignificant (p=0.1099) in the group with low trust. This suggests
13

Emissions treatment effect on emissions posteriors were 0.960*** in the low trust group. Norms
treatment effect on norms posteriors were 0.864*** in the same group. This is similar to the effects
of the full sample in Table 2. These results are not shown in any table.
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that the norms information may have an impact even if it drastically challenges
respondents’ prior beliefs or does not seem fully credible. At the very least, it does
not trigger negative effects, even for respondents with low trust in the norms
information, as was the case with the emissions treatment.

4. Discussion
4.1 Results
Understanding what mere information can achieve is important in the fight against
climate change. This study set out to investigate: (1) what beliefs motivate Swedes’
climate change mitigation efforts, (2) whether their beliefs, about Sweden’s
emissions and the percentage in favor of stricter climate measures, are aligned with
reality and (3) how corrective information affects climate mitigation efforts.
By analyzing data gathered in an online experiment, this study finds that
people living in Sweden underestimate Sweden’s actual climate efforts in relation
to the 1.5°C goal. They also underestimate the percentage of Swedes who state that
they are in favor of stricter climate measures. The study also demonstrates how
holding such beliefs, as well as other economic and social preferences, influences
climate policy support and willingness to do more for the climate.
Effects of the information treatments on subjects' climate mitigation efforts
were documented. Relating the results to the main research question, the answer is
that the two types of information can affect climate mitigation efforts, but that the
effects on (1) Policy support are negative or limited. Providing subjects with
information about Sweden’s emissions lowered policy support for the full treatment
group, lowered it even more in the treatment group with low priors and significantly
more in the group with low trust in the information. The emissions treatment effect
on (1) Policy support for those with low trust in the information was highly
negative. For those with high trust, the emissions treatment had a positive yet
insignificant effect. This points to the respondents' trust in the emissions
information provided matters, but it is unclear precisely to what extent. This is so
because trust also is measured by whether respondents choose to revise their beliefs,
which the low trust group also did14. It therefore seems unlikely that a message
perceived as more credible would have drastically changed the total effect of the
emissions treatment. Even for the group with high trust in the emissions treatment,
no significant positive effect was documented on respondents’ policy support.
Thus, the results provide evidence that the overall effect of the emissions treatment
is insignificant or even negative to respondents’ climate change mitigation efforts.
Out of the two treatments, the norms treatment shows the most potential for
increasing climate mitigation efforts. Providing subjects with information about
14

See footnote 13
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social norms is shown to have a positive impact on climate mitigation efforts of the
full sample, when measured as self-estimated willingness to sacrifice more for the
climate. The effect is even quite similar for the group with low trust in the treatment
information, although just barely insignificant. No effect can be seen on policy
support for any group who received the norms information, meaning that no
treatment showed any significant positive effect on respondents’ policy support. A
potential explanation for this, in case of the norms treatment, could be that the
information lacked enough specificity for it to impact respondents' view of any
concrete policies. The treatment only mentioned the percentage of other Swedes in
favor of “stricter measures”. It could be that the respondents did not, from this fact
alone, infer the that any of the specific policies mentioned would be socially
approved (Bicchieri & Dimant, 2019). The lacking effect could also depend on how
the public as a whole relates to climate change. For instance, Andre et al. (2021),
found a positive effect on specific climate policies with a similar “unspecific”
norms intervention on the US population. But also, that the effect was mostly driven
by those who were climate change deniers, a subgroup which is very small in
Sweden (Naturvårdsverket, 2021a).

4.2 Limitations
The study has several limitations. Some points are worth making regarding the
negative effect of the emissions treatment on respondents’ policy support. The
direct negative effect of the treatment was shown in the mediation analysis in the
results section. This result may be the most important for this study, since it shows
how information interventions sometimes can backfire. However, the direct effect
of the treatment makes it more difficult to interpret precisely in what way
respondents were affected by it. Since respondents receiving the emissions
treatment lowered their policy support, despite revising their beliefs, a range of
external, so far unconsidered, factors could be driving the direct negative effect.
For instance, considering that the respondents’ prior beliefs differed substantially
from the actual amount, the treatment may have caused a sense of resignation in the
respondents which lowered their policy support. Or perhaps being confronted with
information that strongly contradicts prior beliefs about Sweden being a country at
the forefront of fighting climate change could even come across as provocative for
some. This may have led respondents to adhere even more strongly to some related
prior belief, such as that Sweden still need not take further climate action. Such an
explanation aligns quite well with the theory of motivated reasoning, which states
that people seek information that confirms their previously held beliefs and ignores
information that comes into conflict with it (Diamond et al., 2020). Since the
emissions treatment does not explicitly challenge the belief that Sweden does not
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need to take further action, respondents may have held on to this belief even more
strongly after receiving the emissions treatment.
Another possible explanation for the direct negative effect of the emissions
treatment could depend on respondents perceiving what the government currently
is doing as a metric for what further climate measures are in fact necessary. When
the information treatment reveals that Sweden is farther from the 1.5°C goal than
what respondents’ first thought, they may think that things are as they should,
simply due to the fact that more governmental measures aren’t actively being taken.
The fact that the government is not doing more to lower Sweden’s seemingly high
emissions may suggest that nothing new needs to be done. A similar, and perhaps
related, way of explaining the negative effect would be attributing it to what is
known as status quo bias, i.e., that people are overly reluctant to move away from
the status quo. For instance, support for certain climate policies have been shown
to vary greatly depending on whether or not people believe they have already been
implemented (Lang et al., 2021). Even though it is not possible to precisely
determine what lies behind the direct negative effect, the results do provide
evidence that information interventions can produce undesirable outcomes.
Furthermore, there is some risk of experimenter demand effects in the
survey responses. For instance, there is a possibility that respondents did not
actually update their beliefs after receiving the treatment all the while stating that
their posterior beliefs had been updated. This could be a result of respondents’ just
wanting to align their responses with what the survey suggested was correct, rather
than an actual belief update. Another possible explanation for the direct effect
discussed in the previous paragraphs could be a “reverse” experimenter demand
effect. Respondents' policy support was elicited right after they received the
treatment. This may have seemed suggestive that they are “supposed'' to show high
levels of support and therefore instead triggered an opposite response. Some
measures were taken to reduce experimenter demand however, such as anonymity
and neutrally formed information treatments (Haaland et al., 2020). More measures
could have been taken, such as having a follow up survey, or more irrelevant
questions, but would have come at the expense of higher attrition rates and lower
participation (Haaland et al., 2020). Nevertheless, there is evidence that
experimenter demand effects are limited in most cases (de Quidt et al., 2018;
Mummolo & Peterson, 2019).
A final limitation worth addressing is that the main variables do not capture
the full scope of potential climate mitigation efforts among respondents. The main
dependent variable, (1) “Policy support”, has the disadvantage that, even if political
preferences are controlled for, the respondent might not necessarily agree that the
specific policies are appropriate ways to mitigate climate change. Another
remaining problem is that the everyday implications of these specific policies
would undoubtedly still vary for respondents’, even though the policies chosen
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were quite broad for this reason. The policy support variable is thereby a somewhat
limited way of capturing willingness to make concrete sacrifices for the climate,
even though the policies likely would have implied some sacrifices for most
respondents’ everyday lives.
As mentioned in the method section, the two main dependent variables were
meant to complement each other in order to mitigate these issues. A disadvantage
with the dependent variable (2) Willingness to sacrifice more, corresponds to the
advantage of (1), in that respondents may think that they are willing to make further
sacrifices, yet would not be willing to support any measures that would involve
actual sacrifices for their everyday lives. The main remaining problem of using the
two dependent variables is thereby their inability to measure if respondents would
have been willing to make further specific sacrifices that did not correspond to the
sacrifices implied by the policies that made up the (1) Policy support variable.

5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the role of certain beliefs for Swedes’ climate change
mitigation efforts. Based on survey results from 372 people living in Sweden, this
study finds that beliefs about Sweden’s emissions in relation to the 1.5°C goal and
the percentage of Swedes in favor of stricter climate measures positively predict
respondents’ climate mitigation efforts. A wide range of other beliefs such as
altruism, universalism and individual denialism are also shown to predict Swedes’
climate mitigation efforts. Furthermore, the study also finds that Swedes greatly
underestimate Sweden’s emissions as well as the percentage of Swedes in favor of
stricter climate measures.
Most importantly, this study also provides evidence that information
provision can impact climate mitigation efforts, but that the effect may be limited
or even negative. Information about Sweden’s emission is shown to have an overall
negative impact on respondents’ policy support. The negative effect is not mediated
by respondents’ posterior beliefs which are significantly revised by the treatments.
The emissions treatment thus showed a direct negative effect on respondents’
policy support. Information about the percentage of other Swedes in favor of stricter
climate measures is shown to have a positive impact only on subjects' self-estimated
willingness to sacrifice more for the climate. Some questions remain unanswered,
such as what precisely caused the direct negative effect of the emissions treatment.
It is also not documented to what degree respondents’ beliefs were actually changed
and if they will sustain over time.
Clarifying the potential impact of information and how it may vary across
populations with varying demographics and beliefs will be investigated in future
research on the role of information in the fight against climate change. Continued
research on the subject may be advised to put more emphasis on the role of social
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information interventions, since their impact likely is less country specific.
Complimentary research on alternative measures may also be advised since some
information interventions may have limited effects or could potentially even harm
public support for further climate measures.
The results of this study have implications for the continued implementation
of societal measures against climate change and policy design. The use of
information interventions as a way of increasing climate mitigation efforts may
have a limited effect, especially as a means of increasing climate policy support.
When utilized, the information provided should be chosen with care and its impact
should be thoroughly understood beforehand due to the risk of it being detrimental
to citizens' climate mitigation efforts. Interventions relying on social information
may prove to be a “safer” option compared to untested interventions addressing
certain descriptive beliefs. However, the efficiency of social norm interventions
may differ between populations15, so an effect is not guaranteed. Information
interventions may be one way to increase climate mitigation efforts. But their
efficiency when utilized on a given population or cohort ought to be understood
beforehand to be adequately weighed against alternative measures. Ethical
considerations are also necessary before implementing information interventions
on a large scale.
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Appendix
The appendix includes a printout version of the survey. Note that the survey was
only done online and therefore had a slightly different appearance. The texts next
to some answers (i.e., “skip to question X”) such as on the attention screener
question (11), could not be seen in the online format. The questions were also not
numbered in the online format.
Furthermore, the questions that state “Mark only one oval” were drop down
menus in the online format. Also note that only one (or none) of the treatments were
shown to each respondent, in this sketch treatments are shown right after one
another.
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Note: On question 11 (attention screener/group sorting question), the text “Skip to question X”
could not be seen in the online format. The order of the alternatives was also randomized for each
respondent
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Note: There was a page break between question 12 and 13. Question 13 and 14 were only seen by
those who received the emissions treatment.
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Note: Question 15 and 16 were only seen by those who received the norms treatment.
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